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"PAKISTAN OR THE CEMETERY!": 
MUSLIM MINORITY RIGHTS IN 
CONTEMPORARYIND~ 
ANTHONY CHASE* 
If religion. . . continues to interJere with everything, then it will 
not be a mere question oj divorcing it Jrom politics, but oj divorcing 
it Jrom life itself. 
Jawaharlal Nehru 
The rule oj the majority is basically a communal majority and not 
a political majority. It is Jor the majority to realize its duty not to 
discriminate against minorities. Whether the minorities will con-
tinue or will vanish must depend upon this habit oj the majority. 
The moment the majority loses the habit . .. the minorities can have 
no ground to exist. 
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, "father of the Indian Constitution" 
Hindu sentiments in this country cannot be subjugated Jor long. 
This has been proved today. 
Ashok Singhal, participant in the destruction of 
Babri Masjid mosque 
To have loved one horizon is insularity; it blindJolds vision, it 
narrows experience. 
Derek Walcott 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE SITUATION OF MUSLIMS IN INDIA 
Violence between India's Hindus and Muslims-communal vio-
lence in the Indian phrase I-has reached levels not seen since the 
midnight hour of the partition of India and Pakistan. A minority even 
* NSEP Fellow, American University in Cairo. M.A., Islamic Culture, Columbia University; 
M.A., International Mfairs with a specialization in Islamic Law and Public International Law, 
Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, Tufts University. 
1 See Cynthia Keppley Mahmood, Rethinking Indian Communalism, 33 Asian Survey 735 
(1993). Mahmood points out the usefulness of this term, which subsumes a wide variety of 
adjectives (ethnic, religious, etc.), by simply thinking in terms of communities whose identities 
may be defined in various ways. 
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before partition, Muslims at present make up just 1l.4% of the Indian 
population.2 With the exception of Kashmir,3 the Muslim population 
is scattered throughout India; unless protected by the state, it is in no 
position to guard itself from the widespread communal riots which 
overwhelmingly victimize their community. According to figures avail-
able through 1982, roughly three times as many Muslims as Hindus 
have been killed in communal violence.4 Reliable figures as to the total 
numbers killed each year are hard to come by, as estimates vary rather 
drastically. Nonetheless, two things are certain: communal violence has 
been a part of the Indian fabric since independence, and the number 
of people killed in communal violence has increased dramatically over 
the last few years. 
This bloody situation deserves attention on a purely humanitarian 
level. It is, however, also a situation of clear human rights violations. 
In many cases, not only has the Indian state failed to provide protection 
from communal rioting, but it has also been directly linked to this 
rioting. The human rights violations perpetrated by the State have 
been well documented in Kashmir. Indian police have also acted against 
Muslims during communal riots in cities throughout India,5 in particu-
lar, those which swept Northern India after the destruction of the Babri 
Masjid mosque in Ayodhya, killing some 3,000 Muslims.6 Paul Brass 
notes that "in most major riots police firings are directed dispropor-
tionately at Muslims and many of those killed in these riots are killed 
in the police firings themselves, rather than by Hindu rioters."7 
Less dramatic, but symbolically important to the Muslim sense of 
place in the Indian political order, is that the names of all Indian states 
are Hindi, the Indian national anthem is in Hindi, and the country is 
constitutionally named Bharat, symbolizing its pre-Islamic past. Per-
haps this is not unfair-after all, India is a predominantly Hindu 
country-but Muslims also hold only three to four percent of positions 
in state and central administrations and have a generally low rate of 
participation in Indian economic and political life, not to mention 
lower rates of income and literacy.8 In education, out of a total of 3,604 
2 Unless otherwise noted, for all demographic and statistical information in this article, see 
Myron Weiner, India's Minorities: Who Are They? What Do They Want?, in THE INDIAN PARADOX: 
ESSAYS IN INDIAN POLITICS (Ashutosh Varshney ed., 1989). 
3 Kashmir, as a rather distinct situation, will not be specifically dealt with in this paper. 
4 PAUL R. BRASS, THE POLITICS OF INDIA SINCE INDEPENDENCE 198 (1990). 
5 Patricia Risso, Indian Muslim Legal Status, 16 J. S. AsIAN & MIDDLE E. STUD. 2, 63 (1992). 
6 BRASS, supra note 4, at 200. 
7Id. 
81.H. Malik, Beyond Ayodhya: Implications for Regional Security in South Asia, 24 ASIAN AFFAIRS 
292 (1993). 
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degree colleges in India, only fifty-four are managed by Muslims; tech-
nical institutions in the country are just 3.5% Muslim.9 Thus, human 
rights violations extend beyond communal violence to more routine 
discrimination. Combined with the symbolic exclusion of Muslims, it 
could be argued that together these are a violation of the human right 
to political participation. In any case, they certainly reinforce a sense 
of social division and add to Muslim alienation from a Hindu domi-
nated state and society. 
This raises the question of how these human rights violations 
should be addressed. In a situation in which these violations seem to 
be feeding off popular sentiment, can calling the Indian state to ac-
count for human rights violations actually help calm a situation which 
is already running out of control? The answer to this is, simply, yes. To 
begin with, such an accounting could help keep the situation in India 
from further polarization. It is also true that an expanded definition 
of human rights norms may contribute to reconciling communal pas-
sions. Ultimately, a reshaping of the Indian state- centralized struc-
ture-but not necessarily a radical one-may also be necessary in order 
to accommodate and calm these passions and pressures. 
The project of the post-colonial state has been to try to steamroll 
the multiple identities of Indians, as part of the belief that the Indian 
polity "must include a new integrated cultural identity ... to make it 
compatible with 'modern' society."10 If nothing else is clear, it is that 
this project has failed. Thus, the question of Muslim minority rights is 
twofold: one, how to stop the spiral of violence; two, how to solve on 
a long-term basis the instability in Indian politics, for which commu-
nalism is presently the primary touchstone, but which is actually much 
more deeply rooted in the structure of the Indian state. I would put 
forth two initial propositions in this regard: 
1) Can human rights norms be moved away from a predominantly 
individualistic foundation toward collective protections; or are such 
expansive collective rights irreconcilable with human rights and de-
mocracy? 
2) Can a degree of devolution of Indian state central power to 
regional and local configurations give these governing structures greater 
flexibility coinciding with the political and social identities of Indians; 
or is such a devolution of power irreconcilable with the maintenance 
of a center strong enough to guarantee adequate protections for mi-
norities from local intolerances? 
9 M. ALI KETTANI. MUSLIM MINORITIES IN THE WORLD TODAY 125 (1986). 
10 ASHIS NANDY. AT THE EDGE OF PSYCHOLOGY: ESSAYS IN POLITICS AND CULTURE 52 (1980). 
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I will begin looking at these questions in a general vein: a brief 
historical sketch, a look at the contemporary political situation in 
India, and the fundamental arguments which will orient the overall 
analysis. An examination of the specifics of Muslim status in India will 
follow, including the constitution of Muslim identity in India, and the 
protections granted by the Indian Constitution and international law. 
I will attempt to take this overview of the status of Muslims in India 
and see how it has played itself out in the Shah Bano case, which was 
a catalyst for much of the communal conflict of the last few years. I 
will conclude by attempting to integrate the particulars of the Indian 
situation with the general arguments suggested in the first section of 
the paper. 
Communal violence in many parts of the world, including India, 
is often portrayed as historically eternal and inevitable. In fact, India 
has undergone tumultuous social, economic and political change over 
the last centuries, never more than since 1947. Communal identities 
and relations can be properly viewed only in the specific historical 
contexts of these changes. Even early in this century, despite the British 
communalization of the Indian polity, communal relations were not 
divisive; cross-communal interaction and syncretism have long been a 
fact of Indian life. Hindus and Sikhs in the Punjab, and Muslims and 
Hindus in Kashmir, have lived amicably for long periods of history. 
Distinctive heritage, culture or religion does not by itself produce 
conflicts; it can, however, inform communal identity and divisions 
which often serve as the parameters of social, economic, and political 
competition, which ultimately results in conflict. II Such parameters, 
however, are constantly shifting, and are therefore amenable to politi-
cal coalitions, compromise, and diffusion of communal division. Thus, 
the idea that communal separation and violence are eternal must be 
rejected for two reasons: it is simply ahistorical, and it closes off original 
thinking as to political solutions for the present cycle of violence. 
The British Raj affirmed communalism as the basis of Indian 
politics,12 and communal conflict exploded at partition in 1947. Parti-
tion can be traced to a dispute over political guarantees for Muslims 
in post-independence India. The bitterness of this dispute remains a 
II See Maya Chadda, India's Ethnicity. State and Regional Security: A Case of Interlocking 
Balances, 15]. S. ASIAN & MIDDLE E. STUD. 31 (1992). 
12 There is considerable academic debate over the question of Hindu and Muslim communal 
identity. There is some sentiment that as distinct identities they are in a sense a creation of 
British colonialism. See the WILSON QUARTERLY Summer, 1991 issue for several articles debating 
this issue. 
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key complicating factor in the minority rights granted to those Muslims 
who remained in India after partition. It had the effect of leading even 
those sympathetic to a decentralized state to reject strong protections 
for regional, linguistic, and religious communities. The affirmation of 
India's political unity gained precedence over the rights of particular 
groups. Hence, although India is formally a federal state, it has strong 
unitary, centralizing features which it essentially adopted wholesale 
from the British.13 Even though there is some degree of provincial 
autonomy, extensive powers are left to the Center, including emer-
gency powers which grant the central Government the authority to 
dismiss elected state governments and replace them with administra-
tions run directly from New Delhi. The new Indian state also rejected 
such pre-Independence structures as separate electorates and reserved 
representation for Muslims (though castes did retain reserved repre-
sentation); proportional representation was also rejected. 14 
The nationalist elite's ideal was that joint electorates would allow 
for the Indian nation to unite politically, and at the same time would 
protect cultural rights (i.e., the right to promote and preserve a lan-
guage and script). Secularism was to be the state ideology of India, 
providing the moral "basis of public life. "15 Furthermore, this secular-
ism was seen as needing a strong, centralized state in order to allow it 
to prevail over the obsolescent religious values of its populace. 
One major compromise of this principle was made: the right for 
Muslims to retain a separate code of Personal Law, which was agreed 
to by Congress in return for the votes of the orthodox Muslim bloc, 
the Jamiyyat-ul-Ulama. 16 This compromise is the exception to what 
Brass calls the "rule" of the Indian state that there be no "concessions 
to demands for any form of political recognition of a religious com-
13 See BRASS, supra note 4 at 2, 11. 
14Id. at 5. Brass further specifies the center-province relationship of the Indian state as 
follows: 1) There are separate lists of legislative power for the Center and the states, including a 
concurrent list in which the Center may claim priority, with residuary powers left to the Union, 
powers held in reserve for emergencies and other situations in which the Center can legislate on 
matters contained in the state list; 2) the power of the Center to create new states and to revise 
the boundaries of or even eliminate existing federal units; 3) the retention by the Center of 
control over the most lucrative sources of taxation and the authority to collect certain taxes on 
behalf of the states and to distribute the revenues among them; 4) the power of the Center to 
take over the administration of a state and declare President's Rule under specified conditions 
that have been interpreted very broadly; 5) the power to declare a national emergency that, in 
effect, may convert the country into a unitary state. Id. 
15 T.N. Madan, Whither Indian Secularism, 27 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 674 (1993). 
16 BRASS, supra note 4, at 191. 
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munity. . [as] a separate state within the Indian Union or separate 
electorates or any form of proportional representation in elected or 
government bodies."17 
Nehru, however, was caught in a contradiction. While he refused 
to encourage communalism, he had little other choice but to rely on 
Hindu majoritarianism to obtain his political goals. In fact, it can be 
argued that this "Hindu Card" had always been an implicit source of 
congressional support, though in the early years Congress was circum-
spect in its invocations of Hindu themes. Instead, Congress relied more 
on a Hindu majoritarian identification with Indian nationalism. If this 
is true, then the opposition between the secular nationalism of the 
Congress and religious nationalism of the BJP-the party most con-
nected with Hindu communal politics-is a false one. Each are part of 
the desperate search of the modernizing state for a national identity 
on which to legitimize its rule and, hence, have had recourse-explic-
itly or implicitly-to the force of Hindu identity and religious dis-
course. Gandhi, on the other hand, did not reject religion, but rather 
its use as the political unifier of a centralized Indian state which he saw 
as a repudiation of India's diversity. This rejection of singular nation-
alism-secular or religious-in favor of an alternative conception of 
the Indian polity is something which seems increasingly practical, rather 
than idealistic. 
Nehru's reliance on implicit communalism was clearly ambiguous, 
and coincided with the continued condemnation of communalism as 
the bane ofIndian democracy. The Congress Party's communalism was 
made much more explicit when both Indira and Rajiv Gandhi used 
the Hindu Card to maintain their power. Where implicit communalism 
may have been a source of Congress Party support during Nehru's era, 
this was now legitimized by the Gandhis as a national issue; communal 
politics had entered the mainstream. In part, this was due to the logic 
of the Hindu majoritarianism which had always supported the Indian 
state, and in part to the leadership failures of the Gandhis. Indira 
Gandhi, after first attempting to split the Sikh movement by supporting 
its militant arm, shifted tactics and used her crackdown against Sikhs 
as a rallying cry for Hindus. Chattopadhyay reports that Indira Gandhi 
perceptibly "cast away her secular pretence and play [ed] a Hindu Card. 
The new strategy ... aimed at pushing the religious minorities to adopt 
17Id. at 7. 
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aggressive postures so that a concomitant backlash is generated in the 
majority Hindu community. "18 
Rajiv Gandhi went even further with "a confrontational approach 
which was part of a process that carried him well to the right of the 
BJP .... His hard-line rhetoric resembled Rashriya Swayamesevak Sangh 
(RSS) Party claims that the loyalty to India of Communists, Muslims, 
and others was in doubt. "19 Enquiries have found evidence of Congress 
involvement in the pogroms which killed 2,400 Sikhs after Indira 
Gandhi's assassination, but &yiv has refused to order an official inves-
tigation.20 Mahmood reports that "there is now no doubt that the 
Congress party's use of an ti-Sikh rhetoric after the assassination of Mrs. 
Gandhi directly inflamed Hindu sentiments, and that the entire Pun-
jab debacle was tightly interwoven with Congress' political aims."21 
What is also certain is that Rajiv rode a wave of Hindu communalism 
to election victory in 1984. Though Muslims were not at the time 
making any particular demands as a bloc, hostility to the Sikhs carried 
over to Muslims in "an atmosphere of hostility to minority demands 
and behavior [as] the Congress appealed to Hindu nationalism and 
communalism in this [1984] election. "22 
Thus, one sees that the brave declarations of Indian secularism 
(which was made official by Indira Gandhi in 1976, when India became 
the "Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic") were not all 
that they seemed. The religious elements of Gandhi's thought, despite 
Nehru's belief that they were backward and obscurantist, were prob-
ably more in line with the realities of the Indian polity. Nehru and, 
certainly, Indira and Rajiv Gandhi's use of Hindu political support to 
shore up their hold on central power was more insidious, and can be 
seen to have played at least some role in legitimating the exclusivist 
communal politics of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). 
Ironically, in the end, by co-opting the Congress' somewhat con-
tradictory appeals to communalism with a more unreserved invocation 
of Hindu nationalism, it may have been the BJP which gained the most 
political support from this communalization of India. Based in a bitter 
18 Suman Chattopadhyay, Democratic Processes and the Water.shed Elections of 1989 in India, in 
NATIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH ASIA 34 (Sugata Bose & AyeshaJalal 
eds., 1994). 
19James Manor, Parties and the Party System, in INDIA'S DEMOCRACY: AN ANALYSIS OF 
CHANGING STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS 84 (Atul Kohli ed., 1988). 
20Id. at 84. 
21 Mahmood, supra note I, at 725. 
22 BRASS, supra note 4, at 199. 
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sense among Hindus that the Indian secular state has ignored them, 
this nationalism is augmented by factors which include: a fear of Islam 
and Pakistan; resentment of the separate legal status which sets Mus-
lims apart from the rest of the Indian nation; anger at the terrorism 
directed against Hindus in the Punjab and Kashmir; and more tawdry 
motivations such as the economic opportunism of Hindu business 
people who see the possibility of ousting Muslim competitors.23 
The BJP structured a powerful religious-political platform on the 
basis of defining the Indian nation through symbols drawn from Hindu 
texts, beliefs and practices.24 Under the umbrella of the militant Hindu 
"cultural" organization Rashriya Swayamesevak Sangh (RSS) , the BJP 
has called for the establishment of a Hindu rashtra (homeland); rec-
ognition of Bharat Mata (the "divine mother" of the Hindu nation) as 
a kind of national deity; compulsory national Hindu holidays; the 
"reconversion" of Muslims and Christians; the Hinduization of tribal 
peoples; and, most controversially, a uniform legal code revoking the 
right of Muslims to their own Personal Law based on Shari'a princi-
ples. 25 At its most benign, the BJP program would deny all minority 
protections to Indian Muslims. Its more brutal side is succinctly stated 
by BJP partisans: "Pakistan Ya Qabristan!" (Pakistan or the Ceme-
tery!).26 The BJP's Hindutva ideology led to the most famous mass 
action of Hindu communalism, the December 1992 destruction of the 
Babri Masjid by BJP-RSS partisans, symbolizing their rejection of the 
place of Muslims in India.27 
The turmoil of Ayodhya and subsequent rioting led to many pre-
dictions of the imminent fall of the Indian state. As will be seen, 
however, the situation is not quite so dramatic. The BJP's supposed 
Hindu majority is quite splintered and it seems unlikely that the BJP 
can overcome this fragmentation and march unobstructed to central 
power. The immediate danger is not so much that the Indian state will 
"crack-up," but that its state ideology, under pressure from the BJP, will 
become one of an unreserved Hindu nationalism combined with a 
reinvigoration of the state's centralizing impulse. This could have men-
acing consequences for Indian Muslims. 
23 Barbara Stoler Miller, Presidential Address: Contending Narrative~ The Political Life of the 
Indian Epics, 50 J. ASIAN STUD. 786 (1991). 
24 BRASS, supra note 4, at 15. 
25 Weiner, supra note 2, at 117. 
26 Hindu nationalist slogan quoted on page 3 of April 1993 issue of Liberation. 
27 Khushwant Singh, The Coming Indian Crack-Up, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Sept. 9, 
1993, at 28. 
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The defensiveness of a Muslim minority in the face of this-com-
munalist or not-is understandable. The Muslim minority was warned 
after independence by Patel (second in the Congress hierarchy to 
Nehru) that they must "prove" their loyalty to the state. Since then, 
short of surrendering their identity, the Muslim community has re-
mained quite passive, giving up the separate electorates and reserved 
legislative seats which the British had granted and clinging only to their 
separate Personal Law status. There are still only a few small Muslim 
political parties and the Muslim vote has traditionally gone to Congress 
in a vote for the status quo. Since the provocations of the Gandhis in 
the 1970's, the Muslim vote has fragmented, but they have no viable 
alternative to the Congress. 
II. MINORITY RIGHTS AND INDIA'S MUSLIMS: 
THE ESSENTIAL QUESTIONS 
In examining the status of India's Muslim minority, one must ask 
why the following question is a matter of concern: should the majority 
of Indians eventually support a Hindu nationalist movement, is that 
not their affair? Beyond concern for basic human rights protections, 
why should there be international interest in the political situation of 
Indian Muslims? 
One answer to this is that human rights and minority rights are 
interlinked. For some communities, the establishment of minority rights 
may be necessary in order for individual human rights to be realized. 
For example, there is a fundamental human right to political partici-
pation.28 An individual Muslim, however, may define his or her political 
identity in terms of Muslim communal identity. Thus, that individual 
may be able to participate effectively only if Muslims as a group are 
not politically dominated by larger blocs of voting communities, some-
thing that may be assured only if guarantees of a certain level of 
minority group representation are built into a State's political structure. 
Similarly, the right to free use of one's language is a basic human 
right. Such a right,29 however, may only be meaningful if a language-
such as Urdu-is kept alive by allowing for minority language educa-
tional institutions and, in the case of a relatively poor community such 
as Indian Muslims, by giving state funding to such institutions. This 
28 For a full discussion of this right based in Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and Article 25 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights see HURST HANNUM, AUTON-
OMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION (1992). 
29 See HANNUM, supra note 28, at III (details restrictions on this right). 
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continuum between human and minority rights is also shown by the 
human right to nondiscriminatory laws.30 The right to a subset of 
separate laws-such as the right of Muslims in India to a separate 
Muslim Personal Law-takes this right a step further. Simple nondis-
crimination may still reflect the dominant norms of a particular group; 
a right to some separation from the dominant legal system may more 
fully satisfY the ideal of legal equality. Most importantly, perhaps, it is 
a human rights violation to force a Muslim to give up his or her 
religious-cultural identity31 and this individual human right is of par-
ticular importance to a minority group under pressure to acquiesce to 
majority domination. 
At best, human and minority rights should be mutually reinforc-
ing. On the one hand, providing for the fundamental protections 
which can best keep the present cycle of violence from spinning out 
of control, and on the other, providing for political autonomy which, 
in the long term, may be the only way to keep a minority community's 
relations with the state and its diverse political communities in a stable 
equilibrium. Thus, if the international community has a legal interest 
in maintaining human rights standards, it can be argued that this may 
best be done by moving human rights norms in the direction of 
including more minority protections. 
Establishing the specific minority rights protections which could 
or already do extend out of preexisting human rights will set norms 
that give Indian Muslims a valuable tool against the capriciousness of 
the majority community. Absent such norms, the price for Muslim 
immunity from communal violence would seem to be complete disen-
gagement from their religious identity, as even Muslim political passiv-
ity has not spared them the scapegoat role for Hindu nationalists. The 
other alternative-seemingly more likely-would be an increasingly 
militant Muslim community, organized for battle with Hindus and, 
thus, engaging in a dialectic by which India would become increasingly 
defined by communal politics. Such "remedies" for communal violence 
signifY the failure of the Indian state to ensure the individual rights of 
its Muslim citizens. 
The question that arises, however, is whether the remedy of more 
specific minority rights protections might also, in the end, exacerbate 
communal conflict. Communitarian schemes institutionalize commu-
nal division and give power to those factions most attached to exclusive, 
30 See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD), GA Res. 2106 A (XX), Dec. 21, 1965. 
31 Art. 27 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
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singular communal identities, rather than those who would seek to 
accent the pluralism and diversity of individual identity. The result, 
clearly, is a rigidification of communal identity to the ultimate detri-
ment of the goal of a tolerant civil society, and the values of a demo-
cratic society which, by definition, is based on the individual. Individual 
rights may not be sufficient in a situation such as India, it is also clear, 
however, that a simplistic emphasis on minority rights may worsen this 
situation. What must be sought is a system of cross-cutting rights in 
which individual rights and individual identity are not sacrificed at the 
altar of the community. 
A second reason for international interest in the situation of 
Indian Muslims is that the BJP vision of a monolithic, exclusive nation-
alism is paradigmatic of a global explosion of mono ethnic-linguistic-
religious nationalisms. These nationalisms have destabilized many parts 
of the world and, however distinct from the fascisms of the 1930's and 
1940's, often scarily echo the violently exclusivist rhetoric of those 
movements. The danger of this exclusivist ideology comes from the 
contradiction between its rhetoric and the reality that in virtually all 
states diverse ethnic, linguistic and/or religious communities directly 
challenge any ideological insistence on a singular, exclusivist national-
ism, thus setting the stage for violent confrontations. 
The question for India and other states is how this type of contra-
diction can be reconciled and structured in a workable political system. 
A radical devolution of power from the center is often claimed to be 
the magic solution to such problems. In fact, however, as Federal-State 
relations in the United States show, a strong central enforcement 
power is often necessary to maintain basic civil and democratic rights 
for all citizens. While the strongly centralized Indian state may be 
termed a failure by some, central state institutions may still be necessary 
to prevent local intolerances from victimizing minority communities. 
I would suggest the following five arguments as a framework through 
which to examine the complexities of the Muslim minority's relation-
ship to Hindu nationalism. 
1) Nations are not and can not be codeterminate with states. In a 
world of interconnected, layered, and multiple communities, the no-
tion that each self-defined nation is entitled to a state has little prece-
dent in international law and is a recipe for continuous conflict. Such 
pure nations, as a rule, simply do not exist and the attempt to create 
them will often be a bloody affair. 
There is a common analytical confusion between communal soli-
darities and nationalism. If the state is seen as code terminate with a 
"nation" or some sort of majority communal identification, there is a 
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danger of the sort of exclusivist politics which result in bloody transfers 
of populations or pogroms. For example, a country such as India 
embraces many communal solidarities, local, regional, national, and 
extranational. The insistence by anyone of them on exclusively defin-
ing the Indian state ideology will, on the one hand, alienate other 
communities from the state and, on the other, turn such resistance 
into a quasi-treasonous position in the eyes of the dominant commu-
nity.32 Beyond values of tolerance and diversity, such exclusivism is 
simply impractical in a stubbornly pluralistic world. 
India's Muslim minority is one element of this pluralism but, in 
fact, the situation is considerably more complex than a simple major-
ity/minority split. This is demonstrated by a quick look at the demo-
graphics of a state such as Assam, which is a good example of India's 
diversity. Assamese, officially, are 60% of Assam's population. They are, 
however, fearful that their Bengali minority, augmented by illegal im-
migration from Bangladesh, may soon become a majority. This ethnic 
rivalry, however, is also a religious rivalry in that much of the Bengali 
population is Muslim, hence there has been an element of "Hindu" 
reaction among the Assamese. There is also an economic element to 
this situation. The Assamese resent the relatively privileged level of the 
Hindu Bengali population and what they feel is the lack of develop-
ment aid provided by the central government.33 
Assam typifies the multiple levels of identity in India, making it all 
the more contradictory that the BJP and RSS are finding popular 
resonance for their claim that the Indian nation is based on just one 
identity. The clash in India between a singular communal identity, 
demographic diversity and cultural plurality is of more than just aca-
demic interest; it is a stark and dangerous reality in many countries. 
2) While the notion of a Hindu nation is historically unfounded, 
the underlying motivations and political demands of Hindu or other 
religious ideologies-often caricatured as fundamentalist-must be 
taken seriously if strife is to be defused. The easy dismissal of religious 
political identities is not only arrogant, it threatens to exacerbate 
conflict by refusing to recognize fundamental political realities. 
Hindu nationalism and other so-called fundamentalisms are often 
denigrated, in a common social science truism, as simply being about 
power, not religion-as if the two have ever been separate! Stating the 
32 Mahmood, supra note 1, at 735. 
33Jyotirindra Das Gupta, Ethnicity, Democracy, and Development in INDIA'S DEMOCRACY (Atul 
Kohli ed., 1988). 
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obvious-that such groups are interested in power-does not mean 
that they can not legitimately represent the interests of many people 
who have a right to be taken seriously in the political sphere. Nor does 
it mean that such ideologies are necessarily reactionary, in fact, they 
are often the most diverse and dynamic of ideologies, hence their mass 
popularity.34 While it is true that such movements are very much about 
politics, the metaphysical catalyst given by religious symbolics inform 
the substance as well as the style of such ideologies and account for 
their popular resonance. 
In particular, the assumption that liberal democracies are neces-
sarily secular is historically inaccurate. The place of religion in the 
public sphere, to one degree or another, has been strong in many, if 
not most, liberal states-witness the history of the United States.35 It is 
also at odds with what is the reason for being of participatory democ-
racy: the engagement of the passions and values of individuals and 
groups with their political communities. 
This argument is a result of a logical slippage between a condem-
nation of institutional domination of a religion-secularization-and 
an outright condemnation of religion-in which case secularism itself 
becomes an exclusive value system, as it was for Nehru. Conflict comes 
from the attempt of particular ideologies to exclusively dominate a 
political system, not from the ideology in and of itself. The danger is 
that by the outright exclusion of religious values from political dis-
course, one exacerbates a sense of exclusion and creates a reaction 
which results in religious ideologies such as that of the BJP which are 
exclusivist. 
In the case of India, Nehru's statement that "if religion ... contin-
ues to interfere with everything, then it will not be a mere question of 
divorcing it from politics, but of divorcing it from life itself' is the sort 
of cavalier attitude which has proven quite short-sighted. Nonetheless, 
this belief continues to be implicit in the attitudes of many well-me an-
34 This point is best illustrated by reference to the Iranian Revolution, where Islamic politics 
included such variants as Islamic socialism and barefoot Islam which represented novel variants 
ofIslam in accord with an Iranian polity radically transformed by the Shah's modernizing policies. 
See HAMID DABASHI, THEOLOGY OF DISCONTENT (1993). 
35 Is it not Tocqueville who lauded American democracy because of its basis in a polity defined 
by intermediate organizations, most particularly churches? For a more contemporary example of 
this, one might cite Martin Luther King Jr., who said in his "Letter from a BirminghamJail" that 
a 'Just law is a man made code that squares with the moral law or the law of God." I HAVE A 
DREAM (1991). This affirmation of the superiority of religious law is in line with a great deal of 
American tradition. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW 
AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993). 
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ing opponents of the BJP; Bipan Chandra, for example, states that 
"there can be no compromise with communalism. . .it is a form of 
fascism. "36 Whether or not one agrees with its particulars, as a typology, 
communalism per se has nothing to do with fascismY The attempt to 
exclude a priori from the public sphere strongly held individual and 
communal beliefs, which are a source of meaning and legitimacy in 
social life, seems more the product of a particular political prejudice 
than a reasoned, democratic position. It is also, of course, quite im-
practical. 
Nehru and the Congress thought Gandhi was an obscurantist for 
his reliance on religious themes; time has shown that it was Gandhi 
who was the more realistic. It is important to distinguish from the 
absolutist value of keeping religion out of the public sphere and the 
more realistic premise of keeping religion from dominating the public 
sphere. The latter strategy is much more likely to succeed in assuaging 
the extreme polarization that one now sees in India. 
What is at question in India is not engineering religion out of 
existence, nor of excluding it from the public sphere, each of which 
are impractical and, in fact, more likely to intensifY the emotion of 
communal feeling. To Nehru's insistence that the public sphere should 
be immune from religious identity, perhaps the sharpest rejoinder 
comes from Gandhi's statement that "those who say religion has noth-
ing to do with politics do not know what religion means. "38 Secularism 
in India has been the attempt by a minority to impose extreme ration-
alizing values on a majority; this is political folly in the face of religion's 
tremendous normative power.39 Modernity coexists with political-relig-
ious symbols in many societies and it is a mistake to necessarily couple 
modernity with secularism. 
Religious ideologies are not a rearguard action against inevitable 
secularism; such ideologies are based less on nostalgia for the past and 
more on a dynamic-if sometimes reactionary-political programs for 
36 Bipan Chandra, Communalism and the State, in COMMUNALISM IN INDIA 136 (1991). 
37 This is not to say that particular communalist movements could not themselves have 
fascistic organization. The RSS, for example, which has been organizing since 1925 as a "cultural 
organization" and provides cadres for the BJP, in some ways resembles a fascist organization. On 
the other hand, the RSS still values the "nation-society" over the prototypical fascist veneration 
of the State. See generally Cristophe Jaffrelot, "La Place de I'Etat dans l'Ideologie Nationaliste 
Hindoue." 
38 T.N. Madan, Secularism in Its Place, 46 J. ASIAN STUD. 7 (1987). 
39 See id. Madan overstates his case, but nonetheless brings out the absurdities in Nehru's 
secularization project. Id. 
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the future. Instead, the question should be one of harnessing the 
passions of people, religious and otherwise, in a structure which will 
allow these passions to engage in the political system without dominat-
ing it, thereby dominating other communities. To do this, what should 
be sought is a political system which gives political space to India's 
minorities, but which also addresses the concerns of its Hindu majority. 
3) As individuals define themselves and are defined in terms of 
communities, minority and human rights should be seen as quite 
interconnected. Minority group protections start with essential human 
rights protections, i.e., state sanctioned violence against people based 
on their religion or ethnicity violates basic human rights norms. An 
individual's place within a political community cannot be defined 
solely in terms of the individual-state relationship which serves as the 
paradigm of human rights. It ignores the complex formation of an 
individual's political identity and is not necessarily an aid to a minority 
faced with a majority determined to exclude them from political power. 
Fundamental human rights and minimal traditional minority rights 
(i.e., cultural, linguistic, religious) do not ensure any degree of political 
autonomy from a dominant state. Since World War II, states have been 
more resistant to minority rights than human rights. This is because 
the political protections of minority rights can be seen to threaten the 
legitimacy and stability of a particular group's claim to central power 
and "encourage fragmentation or separatism and undermine national 
unity and the requirements of national development. "40 
Dramatic advances beyond the existing minimal guarantees to 
minority rights do not seem to be forthcoming. Nonetheless, a push 
to move human rights into a greater accord with the group basis of 
political identity does seem to be occurring, and this would seem to 
be the most promising avenue for the extension of minority protec-
tions. In addition to Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), recent years have seen the drafting of 
the following instruments: International Labour Office (ILO) Conven-
tion No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Inde-
pendent Countries; the Document of the 1990 Copenhagen Meeting 
of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (as 
well as the creation of the office of the CSCE High Commissioner on 
National Minorities); the General Assembly Declaration on the Rights 
of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic 
40 See HANNUM, supra note 28, at 71. 
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Minorities; and the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples. 
The type of extension of human rights to collective protections is 
the most likely manner of extending the minority rights already in 
place. One must also consider, however, whether such minority rights 
fundamentally conflict with notions of the role of the individual in a 
democracy. By valuing the group over the individual, the civic obliga-
tions of the individual, as well as the basis of the progress which has 
been made in individual human rights protections, are devalued. More 
fundamentally, group identities are rigidified such that they deny the 
multiple and shifting identities (including the individual self) that 
allow for democracy to function as something other than a negotiation 
structure between pre-ordained communal groups. 
4) Democracy is quite tough on minorities. This is counterbal-
anced by the fact that democracy does not equal absolute rule of the 
majority. In virtually all democratic states, there are mechanisms to 
keep simple majorities from dominating the political process, most 
often through parliamentary representation stacked to favor particular 
regions or minorities. 
India, strangely enough, is to a great degree an exception to this. 
In the bitter aftermath of partition and the coming to power of a 
putatively Pan-Indian nationalist movement, virtually all religious mi-
nority protections were rejected. For example, India is one of the few 
democracies to have a bicameral parliament in which both chambers 
are popularly elected. This reflects the post-independence concern 
with national unity over the privileging of any particular communi-
ties.41 ModifYing this system to give greater political protections to 
minorities would help ensure that the Indian state will not become the 
agent of a majority bent on excluding particular minorities from India. 
Why should a majority choose to limit its democratic power? For 
one reason, the BJP definition of India as split between Muslims and 
Hindus is a grossly simplified version of the Indian polity. Agitation 
against the centralized Indian state is strong among linguistic and 
regional groups throughout India, with many movements for greater 
autonomy based on language or region. One approach to keep the 
Indian state from its much feared implosion would be to allow such 
groups guarantees of the protection of the central government. This 
will help Muslims, of course, but in the long term it will also aid other 
41 Castes, however, are the exception. Lower Castes were made the beneficiary of privileged 
status in an attempt to rectifY the inequalities of India's hierarchical social structure. 
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Indian minorities and ultimately, aid the Hindu majority by keeping 
the state stable. 
A second reason, which follows from the first, is that in reality it 
is very hard to say that there is any majority community in India. There 
are four types of minorities in India: linguistic, religious, caste, and 
tribal. To give one detailed example of this, West Bengal has a popu-
lation of 44.3 million (as of 1971),20.6 million (46.5%) of whom are 
scheduled tribes, scheduled castes, or religious minorities. There are 
approximately three million linguistic minorities, of which Weiner 
estimates one-half do not overlap with other minority categories, mak-
ing "minorities" virtually 50% of Bengal. Of course, Bengalis consider 
themselves a minority in the context of the Indian nation.42 
Given the multiple social identities of Indians, most of India's 
Hindu "majority" are, at the same time, members of a minority com-
munity. Thus, India's real majority is a combination of any number of 
minorities. It can be argued that the interests of the majority of Indi-
ans, including Hindus, are best served by a government with multiple 
centers of power, keeping any single group from dominance, but 
guaranteeing certain fundamental rights for citizens of each of these 
communities. 
5) Another approach to reconciling communal passions to inher-
ently pluralistic states is to devolve power away from the center toward 
regional and local political communities. Such a strategy is particularly 
apt in India, as it would be in accord with Gandhi's original vision of 
a radically decentralized state in which "the state would be built up 
from the village, with the latter as the central political focus and with 
the satisfaction of the basic needs of its people as the aim of all social 
and political institutions. "43 
Nehru and the Congress flatly rejected this vision in favor of the 
sort of centralized concentration of power which was to characterize 
virtually all post-colonial states. The official ideology of the Indian state 
came to rest on a monolithic concept of sovereignty borrowed from 
Britain which denied the multiple social identities and "layered sover-
eignties" of India's pre-colonial past. This was seen as the only way to 
develop a modern, liberal, secular society. 
The Muslim League which, ironically, is commonly identified with 
the secession of Pakistan, was the group pushing the hardest for Indian 
national unity, but at the price of guaranteed rights for each of the 
42Weiner, supra note 2, at 103. 
43 BRASS, supra note 4, at 33. 
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"nations" contained therein. The Congress, a supposedly Pan-Indian 
independence movement, adopted the mantle of exclusive representative 
of Indian nationalism and ultimately pushed for the sectioning off of 
Muslim majority territory so that it could be assured of inheriting the 
full power of the British Raj.44 One wonders if the model originally 
proposed by the Muslim League, that of a decentralized, multi-sover-
eign state, in the end was not more suitable to political stability and 
equality than the attempts by a movement such as the Congress to 
identifY the state with a singular nationalist movement, and to concen-
trate all power at this nexus. In any case, the centralizing projects of 
many post-colonial states have left a debris of conflict and strife indi-
cating that this sort of concentration of power may actually sharpen 
and exacerbate divisions, leading to the sorts of confrontations one 
now sees in India. 
The BJP would hope to reinvigorate the Congress' centralized 
Indian state, which by now is widely recognized as decrepit and dis-
credited. This has been described as seeking "centralization by propa-
gating an ideology that bestows a single identity on the country. "45 It 
is hard to see how this will successfully supersede the reality of India's 
fragmented polity. In fact, despite the BJP's pan-Hindu rhetoric, its 
main support has come from upper castes anxious to maintain their 
social and economic statuS.46 
A more practical and feasible alternative to the monolithic, cen-
tralized post-colonial state would be a type of decentralized polity 
which will allow for the overlapping communities of India to have 
political control of their destinies and a stake in political stability. 
There are various methods which can be used to do this: from a 
decentralized unitary state, federalism, regionalism, devolution of power 
to locally elected bodies and electoral systems such as separate electoral 
rolls, separate blocs of seats, proportional representation systems and 
group veto powers.47 Accommodating alternative ideological frame-
works rather than the centralizing impulse of the BJP could allow for 
a stabilized Indian state, but on a model which creates political space 
for the diverse communities of India including, most importantly, the 
44 See AYESHA JALAL. THE SOLE SPOKESMAN (1985). 
45BASU ET. AL .• KHAKI SHORTS AND SAFFRON FLAGS 114 (1993). 
46 See generally Mahmood. supra note 1. at 734; see also Pradeep Chhibber & Subhash Misra. 
Hindus and the Balni Masjid. 33 Asian Survey 7 (1993) (discussing full demographic information 
on the social basis of Hindu communalism). 
47 See generally Claire Palley. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND MINORITIES. Minority Rights Group. 
Report No. 36 (1993). 
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Hindu community. As has been mentioned previously, such a restruc-
turing must still leave room for the guarantee by the central state of 
certain fundamental rights, stopping particular communities from im-
posing intolerant majoritarian policies. 
To examine the above arguments in the context of India, one 
needs to look in some detail at the guarantees which presently exist 
for India's Muslim minority; whether or not these offer sufficient 
protections, or if they have perhaps backfired by creating resentment 
and reaction among the majority Hindu population. One might also 
ask how such guarantees which now exist and those that might come 
into being are sustainable if the majority community refuses to respect 
them. Is it reasonable to give eleven percent of the population a 
guaranteed share of power; is this fair to other citizens who do not 
happen to be part of what could then be perceived to be a privileged 
minority? Is this not a recipe for exacerbating conflict? 
What is at stake in Hindu nationalism is the ideological definition 
of the Indian state. This ultimately has less to do with the particulars 
of Muslim demands for minority rights and more to do with whether 
the majority ideology continues to see a place for Muslims within the 
Indian state. A majority community tends to define national aspira-
tions, and one must ask whether the logic of Indian nationalism leads 
to the exclusion of Muslims from the notion of the Indian state. This 
exclusion will eventually become codeterminate with an imagined Hindu 
nation, against all historical precedent. 
To address such issues, one needs to confront the basic question 
of what constitutes Muslim identity in India. While Muslims are eleven 
percent ofIndia's population, this population is quite fragmented, with 
many regional and linguistic differentiations. One wonders to what 
degree Islam is even a basis of political identity in India: are Muslims 
historically a cohesive community which has acted as a political bloc? 
At the same time that the fragmentation ofIndia's Muslim community 
must be recognized, however, the normative character of Islam needs 
to be recognized as well. At key moments in Indian history, Islamic 
symbols have served to mobilize-albeit temporarily-a unified Mus-
lim community. To give two examples, one sees this in the Khilafat 
movement-the mobilization during World War I on behalf of the 
Ottoman Empire by India's Muslims-and Muslim mobilization prior 
to partition. Each were demonstrations that, at particular moments and 
over particular issues, Islam is a unifying factor for India's Muslims; a 
unity which is reinforced by events such as communal riots which 
emphasize the threat of a Hindu majority. Thus, Islam continues to be 
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a normative factor in Muslim social identity, at the same time that many 
other factors alter and fragment this unifying identity. 
III. THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION 
As we have seen, Nehru's vision of the Indian state ultimately 
triumphed over the radical decentralization proposed by Gandhi. With 
this came the drafting of a constitution which contained contradictory 
clauses in terms of Muslim minority rights. These rights are acknow-
ledged, but are left somewhat undefined. This type of imprecision in 
defining group rights-while harmful just by the fact of its impreci-
sion-is not surprising in that Dr. Ambedkar, the prime mover behind 
the Indian constitution, declared the individual rather than the group 
to be its basis.48 Minority rights were subsidiary and somewhat limited. 
This individual basis for constitutional law is in line with Nehru's 
secularist, unitary ideology which dictated that law be applicable to 
individuals, not groups. 
The constitutional protections granted to groups are primarily 
cultural, including the right of religious minorities to establish and 
administer educational institutions (Article 30), and for voluntary par-
ticipation in religious instruction in State institutions (Article 28), the 
right to maintain and use languages, scripts and cultures (Article 29.1), 
freedom of religion (Article 25), as well as freedom from discrimination 
(Article 14, 29.2). Positive state obligations to minorities are framed in 
terms of general rights which, as will be seen, are still subsidiary to the 
central power of the State. 
A policy of protecting minorities from majority pressures through 
proportional representation was considered, but rejected after bitter 
debate. Both houses of the Constituent Assembly are representative, 
with no upper house based on regional or communal grounds and the 
final wording held that "no person shall ... be included in any special 
electoral roll for any such constituency on grounds only of religion, 
race, caste, sex or any of them."49 This was supplemented by an elec-
toral law that forbade appeals to religion, religious sentiments, and 
religious symbols. 50 
Dhavan describes this system as one in which religious groups were: 
relegated to operate in civil society, denied political repre-
sentation and the full State support given to non-religious 
48 Rajeev Dhavan, Religious Freedom in India, 35 AM. J. COMPo L. 209 (1987). 
49Id. at 213. 
50Id. 
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groups. They were accorded freedom of speech and con-
science and a right to equality that most other groups enjoyed 
as a matter of fact ... without many of the limitations ... The 
Constitution effectively segregated [religious groups] and de-
politicized them.51 
55 
It is also worth mentioning Dhavan's statement that Indian "courts 
have generally expanded limitations and marginalized rights" of relig-
ious groups. 52 This type of limiting is called for by the Constitution 
itself, as is illustrated by the full text of Article 25: 
Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other 
provisions of this Part,53 all persons are equally entitled to 
freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice 
and propagate religion. 
This is in line with the reformist agenda of the Congress. Freedom 
of religion is given as a right, but one subsidiary to the greater needs 
of the nation and open to restriction when it fits the "morality" of 
the State. 
The only right which goes beyond non-discriminatory and cultural 
clauses is, as mentioned before, the right of Muslims to maintain a 
separate system of Personal Law. In principle, Article 44 of the Consti-
tution calls for a uniform civil code to "evolve," overruling this excep-
tion.54 The Constituent Assembly passed a resolution in 1948 rejecting 
the contention that Muslim Personal Law is inseparable from Islam 
and, therefore, protected from legislative interference. Efforts to im-
plement Article 44, however, have been strongly resisted by the Muslim 
community. In a trade-off for Muslim electoral support, Congress has 
never moved to set Article 44 in motion. 
The courts have attempted to attack this separate domain of per-
sonal law, most notably in the Shah Bano case in which the Indian 
Supreme Court ruled that India's secular law took precedence over 
Islamic law regarding the maintenance rights of divorced Muslim women. 
It is interesting to note that the Court openly recognized that such 
increased support was obligatory per Islamic law. Rather than limiting 
51Id. at 217. 
52Id. at 225. 
53 Other provisions forbid untouchability, and allow for the confiscation of land, even if part 
of a religious endowment. 
54 There is one concession to Hindu communalism in Article 47 of the Indian Constitution, 
which holds that steps will be taken to protect cows from slaughter-a positive state action to 
enshrine a Hindu religious stricture in a "secular" Constitution. 
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itself to this ruling, however, in what Dhavan calls "an accusatory 
posture," the court held that the extra payments should be made under 
Indian secular law. Risso mentions that "Muslim women were and still 
are concerned that a uniform code would reduce the rights to property 
and inheritance that they have in Islamic personallaw;"55 it should be 
pointed out, however, that while Islamic law is theoretically more gen-
erous in this respect than Hindu law, it is often interpreted in a rather 
harsh manner which leaves the woman with very little. Nonetheless, 
the court's decision seemed to have less to do with the justice of the 
woman's claim and more with an attempt to assert the primacy of the 
universal code, as it could have made the same ruling simply in terms 
of Muslim Personal Law. In the end, Shah Bano herself asked the court 
to reverse its decision.56 
Congress, fearful of a backlash among Muslim voters, interceded 
to overrule the Court's decision with its Muslim Women's Bill. Ironi-
cally, this bill is drafted in such a way that Muslim women are stripped 
of many of the entitlements they would have had under Islamic law as 
it was previously interpreted. This bill has, itself, created a huge back-
lash against such special protections: 
Rajiv Gandhi was seen by many Hindus, both communal and 
secular, to have surrendered to an insistent coalition of ortho-
dox ulema for the sake of expediency to win the 'Muslim 
block vote.' The stage was set for Hindu militants to demand 
some balancing concession by government to the majority 
community. 57 
Many date the resurgence of the BJP and the Babri Masjid contro-
versy to this event. 58 
Thus, the Shah Bano case points out the contradictions of the 
Indian state structure and constitution. On the one hand, the mass 
mobilization of the Muslim community against the ruling shows the 
pressure which that community is feeling from what it perceives to be 
a Hindu onslaught. Further, the Muslim community'S ability to pres-
sure Rajiv Gandhi into passing a bill far more biased against women 
than what had previously been in place shows that this polarization of 
55 Risso, supra note 5, at 60. 
56 See AsHGAR ALI ENGINEER, THE SHAH BANO CONTROVERSY (1987). 
57 Theodore P. Wright, The Bahari Masjid Controoersy in India, in ISLAM, POLITICS, AND 
SOCIETY IN SOUTH ASIA 181 (Andre Wink ed., 1991). 
58 Romila Thapar, Imagined Religious Communities? Ancient History and the Modern Search for 
a Hindu Identity, 23 MOD. AsIAN STUD. 650 (1989). 
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communal feeling has, predictably, aided the most extreme elements 
on each side. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that those in 
the RSS-BJP who remonstrated most loudly that there must be one civil 
code for all Indians were also those who protested in the 1950's and 
1960's when Hindu Personal Law was reformed and made part of 
common civil code. Aside from this hypocrisy, it is also interesting to 
note that the family law in the common civil code is, in fact, a reformed 
version of Hindu Personal Law.59 This indicates, once again, the iden-
tification of the norms of the "secular" Indian state with the norms of 
the dominant Hindu community to which Muslims are being asked to 
conform. 
It is rather certain that continuing the attack on Muslim Personal 
Law will lead only to further polarization of India. Shah Bano shows 
the difficulty of a court legislating on communal matters and attempt-
ing to impose the universalism of Article 44. The attempt to carry out 
to its full extent the fundamentally unitary, secularist bent of the 
Indian Constitution and state ignores the manifold ways in which 
communal identities can assert themselves in the political, social, and 
legal domains. This is particularly significant when the ruling Congress 
party also finds it necessary to unofficially rely on such identities for 
political support. 
One must ask, however, why it is unfair to have a common code 
which reflects the norms of the vast majority of the citizens of a state. 
Would this not prevent the perception of special privileges which is 
quite certain to lead to resentments and possibly exacerbate conflict? 
There is no adequate answer to this question, which is the result of 
tensions created by conflicting rights and demands. It must be recog-
nized, however, that some degree of conflict may be inevitable; the 
attempt must be made to avoid overreliance on legal categorization 
and to channel such conflict into the give-and-take of its political 
sphere. The protections of individual human rights can be interpreted 
and extended in a manner which includes community practices, but 
care must be taken to avoid too rigid a system of legally defined 
minority rights. An overemphasis on group rights plays into the hands 
of those who assert power on the basis of blind loyalty to a particular 
community and rejects the cooperation and coexistence necessary for 
a tolerant and democratic society. One can hope, however, that in a 
more decentralized state the tensions among rigidly defined commu-
59 Madhu Kishwar, Prrr Women or Anti-Muslim: The Furor over Muslim Personal Law, in ENGI-
NEER, supra note 56. 
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nities would be defused in the political sphere, at the same time that 
a carefully calibrated balance of individual and group rights will be 
ensured by the State. If different communities have a certain amount 
of autonomy, these particularities would not be seen as special privi-
leges which instigate resentment and conflict. They would be the norm 
for all communities of a certain size. At the same time, fundamental 
rights would continue to be guaranteed from the center. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Since 1945, the international community has emphasized human 
rights rather than minority rights. Of course, as has been seen, these 
are linked and, for example, the important provisions for non-discrimi-
nation in the Indian Constitution are legally as protective of groups as 
they are of individuals. The Indian Constitution also provides the rights 
to religion, culture and language which are minimum human rights 
standards. The standards are equally applicable to minority groups 
which, in fact, can only be exercised in a collectivity. These rights are 
directly addressed in the General Assembly Declaration on the Rights 
of Minorities and in Article 27 of the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. Article 27 provides that: 
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minori-
ties exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be 
denied the right, in community with the other members of 
their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and prac-
tice their own religion, or to use their own language.6o 
Though the Indian State legally recognizes these minimum rights, 
as I hope has been seen, this is not sufficient as an answer to India's 
communal problem. Calling the Indian State to account for its human 
rights violations-however necessary-would also seem to be inade-
quate to prevent continuing violations. One partial remedy could be a 
conservative extension of human rights norms to coincide more pre-
cisely with the needs of minorities. I have previously mentioned several 
areas in which there is a fairly natural continuum between established 
human rights and more expansive minority protections. Linguistic 
6OInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,999 V.N.T.S. 171. 
Indian ratification of this Treaty was on April 10, 1979 with no reservations. However, in a 
declaration it is stated in relation to Article 1 that self-determination applies "only to the people 
under foreign domination and that these words do not apply to sovereign independent States or 
to a section of a people or nation-which is the essence of national integrity." 
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rights are, in terms of India, another example of the possible useful-
ness of such an extension. 
India's Muslims are predominantly Urdu speakers and there is no 
doubt that the Indian State respects the basic human right as guaran-
teed by Article 27 for Urdu speakers to freely use their language. It is, 
however, quite common for well-educated Indians to be illiterate in 
their native Urdu, as state schools use Hindi, English, or even regional 
languages, but not Urdu. Because the Urdu speaking population is 
scattered throughout India, Urdu does not even have the status of 
regional languages spoken by less than half as many people. 
This may, possibly, be a link to discrimination against Muslims, as 
it serves to educationally disadvantage those for whom Urdu is a first 
language. More to the point, however, it is clearly a source of friction 
and part of the symbolic exclusion of Muslims from the public sphere. 
This exclusion can not only be seen as discriminatory, but also seems 
to impinge on Urdu speakers' right to popular participation as well as 
their ability to "enjoy their own culture," as the literary traditions of 
Urdu can not be maintained if even educated Urdu speakers are not 
literate in their native tongue. Thus, beyond the basic right to free use 
of language, one can possibly extrapolate rights, such as the right to 
education in one's own language, which more fully address the needs 
ofIndia's Muslim minority. This is an example of how, implicit in existing 
human rights, the possibility exists of defining more meaningful rights 
for a minority. These rights, however, need to be concretized and made 
explicit, as well as limited, such that Urdu does not become the sole 
language of Muslims, which could have the effect of further dividing 
Indian society and excluding Muslims from integration and opportunity. 
The General Assembly Declaration on the Rights of Persons Be-
longing to Minorities, one of the few significant post-World War II 
minority rights documents, does take a more far-reaching approach to 
making concrete such positive obligations of states. Of course, as a U.N. 
Resolution, the Declaration is not binding on States. The Declaration 
holds in Article 4.2 that "States shall take measures to create favour-
able conditions to enable ... minorities to express their characteristics 
and to develop their culture, language, religion ... ;" Article 4.3 holds 
that "States should take appropriate measures so that, wherever possi-
ble, ... persons belonging to minorities have adequate opportunities to 
learn their mother tongue or to have instruction in their mother 
tongue."61 
61 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or 
Linguistic Minorities, adopted in Res. 1992/16. 
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A fuller elaboration of the rather weak injunction that states "should" 
allow "adequate opportunities" for learning and instruction in a mi-
nority's native tongue could address the second class status of Urdu 
and remove at least one source of friction between Hindus and Mus-
lims. A key BJP demand is that Hindi be made the national language, 
though it is the language of only twenty-five percent of Indians.62 This 
is the sort of action which could exacerbate minor friction over lan-
guage into a major source of conflict. This could be usefully addressed 
by international legal norms which, for example, on the principle of 
the right to popular participation, could be construed to preclude the 
imposition of one national language in such a way that languages 
which are spoken by a defined percentage of the population are ex-
cluded from the public sphere, as is the BJP's intention. 
V. BALANCING RIGHTS AND DEMANDS 
Theodore Wright argues that the fundamental problem in India 
is a "majority backlash." Wright concedes that virtually all special pro-
tections the Indian State grants go to castes and regional minorities, 
not to Muslims. Nonetheless, Wright insists that Hindus have had their 
"hard-won comparative advantage whittled away by arbitrary, anti-mod-
ern group benefits, "63 and that Muslims would be best served by rec-
ognizing that they "are a threatened minority and enter into a contract 
with the Hindu majority to abide by the rules set by the majority in 
order to ensure their survival in a hostile environment. "64 Wright makes 
a rather illogical jump to an extreme conclusion, but it is true that 
Muslims are a minority and that their separate Personal Law (their only 
"privilege" and one that has no particular effect on Hindu "advan-
tages") is a flash point of conflict. 
This backlash points to a serious issue with minority rights, which 
is the degree to which such rights devalue the rights of an individual 
and of a majority. If one is to maintain a state's legitimacy, one needs 
to maintain a sense for all individuals that they have fair representation 
in the state. Recognizing the needs of various communities runs the 
danger of reducing the Indian polity to a balancing act among squab-
bling communal sectors. The difficulty of keeping such a balance is 
nowhere better demonstrated than in Yugoslavia, where a system of 
62 Weiner, supra note 2, at 105. 
63Id. at 184. 
64 Id. 
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extreme decentralization eventually went out of balance, with no cen-
ter strong enough to keep the state from exploding. 
In speaking of such a situation of conflicting rights and demands 
there are no easy answers. One can only begin by insisting that the 
Indian State should be based on a type of nationalism which encom-
passes and exalts its diverse citizens and communities, rather than a 
singular nationalism which excludes them. There must be an attempt 
to create state structures which encourage the participation and en-
gagement of all citizens, rather than being based on devotion to a 
limiting ideology. The BJP would hope to recreate national unity, but 
at the cost of excluding certain communities. To some, this is the last 
chance for the decrepit Indian state to right itself. The question at 
hand is whether the very existence of a pluralistic Indian State, with 
tolerance for religious minorities, has been put in question by the 
power of such explicit appeals to Hindu nationalism. 
It is helpful to remember, in this regard, that Hindu nationalism 
is very much of a minority phenomenon of Hindu elites. For all of the 
attention it has garnered, there is no sign that it will gain central power. 
This does not mean that this movement should be disregarded. It is 
important as a symptom of the root cause of India's troubles, which is 
found in the exhaustion of the Nehruvian centralized state with its 
tradition of impatience with alternate loyalties interposing themselves 
between the individual and the State. 
An alternative to the BJP can be based in an understanding that 
this sort of exclusivist nationalism is a politically impractical and po-
tentially bloody undertaking. As shown by Gandhi, there is no essential 
reason why religious politics need to be exclusivist and, perhaps, more 
progress would be made if religion and the modern state were recog-
nized as compatible with each other. If communal passions are to be 
accommodated within one state, however, there is a need to protect 
that state from the domination of one community. International hu-
man rights standards are basic to this, but must be seen in a more 
expansive light such that minority communities gain meaningful pro-
tections. A reconfiguration of the centralizing model of the Indian 
State may be the best way to structure such protections into the Indian 
State, though this will be quite difficult to achieve in practice. 
Such a reconstruction could have two complementary elements. 
One, an increased voice at the center for minority communities through 
a schema such as proportional or reserved representation. On a sec-
ond track, a decentralization of the Indian State would allow for mul-
tiple centers of power within India-thus giving political power to any 
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number of political communities within India, depending on regional, 
local, or particular configurations. Such a reconfiguration of the In-
dian State would hope to accommodate the various minorities of India, 
its Hindu majority, as well as the changing and overlapping combina-
tions of each of these. 
The extreme solution of Muslim obeisance to Hindus, which Wright 
suggests, is quite impractical and would likely lead to a violent reaction 
by India's Muslims. On the other hand, an over-reliance on minority 
rights may further instigate a Hindu reaction. A simple decentraliza-
tion of power, in turn, would leave a scattered Muslim minority quite 
vulnerable to communal violence. The balance which must be struck 
among these various elements is precarious, but it is certainly prefer-
able to the exhausted Congress party, corrupt and betrayed by its 
leaders, or the BJP alternative with its continuance of the centralizing 
project of the post-colonial era to a more exclusivist end. The key to 
the proposed balancing act would be different loci of power, all with 
considerable autonomy, but combined with guarantees of fundamental 
rights from both the national and international level. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
While conflict between Muslims and Hindus is by no means inevi-
table-in fact, it is the exception rather than the norm of Indian 
history-it is on a worrisome spiral. It is helpful to remember that, 
nonetheless, there continues to be much communal cooperation65 and 
that this, too, has a long tradition. At present, there are several hopeful 
signs that such cooperation can take precedence over conflict. Instead 
of a continuing bidding war of anti-Muslim sentiment between the BJP 
and Congress, as seemed to be the trend for some time, in certain 
states (Uttar Pradesh, notably) Muslims have entered coalitions with 
lower caste political parties (remember that BJP's followers are primar-
ily upper caste) which give them each a share of real political power 
for the first time since partition.66 The challenge ofIndia is to maintain 
an integrated society and egalitarian, democratic politics while resolv-
ing conflicts in a non-violent way. This project would be aided by the 
realization that exclusivist ideologies, religious or secular, are harmful 
social myths which are inherently unstable because they elevate values 
65 BRASS, supra note 4, at 25. 
66 Voice of the Voters: Major Parties Chastened in State PoUs, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 
Dec. 16, 1993, at 22. 
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to the realm of the absolute, placing them in conflict with inherently 
pluralistic societies. Such values should not, however, be considered 
demons to be tamed, but rather the very basis of a political engage-
ment and commitment. The trick is how to reconcile the passion of 
such values with the pluralism and diversity of virtually all states. The 
essential step is to allow the space for such political communities to 
express their values and identities while, at the same time, using hu-
man rights, minority rights, and flexible state structures to ensure that 
such values can not dominate the equivalent rights of other groups. 
Until those in political power are committed to stand against commu-
nal exc1usivism and integrating centralism, however, such a society will 
remain a distant ideal. 

